The kernel syslog contains debugging information that is often useful
during exploitation of other vulnerabilities, such as kernel heap
addresses. Rather than futilely attempt to sanitize hundreds (or
thousands) of printk statements and simultaneously cripple useful
debugging functionality, it is far simpler to create an option that
prevents unprivileged users from reading the syslog.
This patch, loosely based on grsecurity's GRKERNSEC_DMESG, creates the
dmesg_restrict sysctl. When set to "0", the default, no restrictions are
enforced. When set to "1", only users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can read the
kernel syslog via dmesg(8) or other mechanisms.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: explain the config option in kernel.txt]
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- core_uses_pid
- ctrl-alt-del
- dentry-state
- core_uses_pid
- ctrl-alt-del
- dentry-state
- domainname
- hostname
- hotplug
- domainname
- hostname
- hotplug
==============================================================
==============================================================
+dmesg_restrict:
+
+This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented from using
+dmesg(8) to view messages from the kernel's log buffer. When
+dmesg_restrict is set to (0) there are no restrictions. When
+dmesg_restrict is set set to (1), users must have CAP_SYS_ADMIN to use
+dmesg(8).
+
+The kernel config option CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT sets the default
+value of dmesg_restrict.
+
+==============================================================
+
domainname & hostname:
These files can be used to set the NIS/YP domainname and the
domainname & hostname:
These files can be used to set the NIS/YP domainname and the
unsigned int interval_msec);
extern int printk_delay_msec;
unsigned int interval_msec);
extern int printk_delay_msec;
+extern int dmesg_restrict;
/*
* Print a one-time message (analogous to WARN_ONCE() et al):
/*
* Print a one-time message (analogous to WARN_ONCE() et al):
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+int dmesg_restrict = 1;
+#else
+int dmesg_restrict;
+#endif
+
int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
{
unsigned i, j, limit, count;
int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
{
unsigned i, j, limit, count;
+ .procname = "dmesg_restrict",
+ .data = &dmesg_restrict,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &zero,
+ .extra2 = &one,
+ },
+ {
.procname = "ngroups_max",
.data = &ngroups_max,
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
.procname = "ngroups_max",
.data = &ngroups_max,
.maxlen = sizeof (int),
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+ bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
+ default n
+ help
+ This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
+ syslog via dmesg(8).
+
+ If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
+ unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
config SECURITY
bool "Enable different security models"
depends on SYSFS
config SECURITY
bool "Enable different security models"
depends on SYSFS
{
if (type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN && from_file)
return 0;
{
if (type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN && from_file)
return 0;
+ if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;