2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
30 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
31 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
32 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
33 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
34 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
35 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
36 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
38 #include <linux/kernel.h>
39 #include <linux/slab.h>
40 #include <linux/string.h>
41 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
42 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
43 #include <linux/errno.h>
45 #include <linux/sched.h>
46 #include <linux/audit.h>
47 #include <linux/mutex.h>
48 #include <linux/selinux.h>
49 #include <net/netlabel.h>
59 #include "conditional.h"
67 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
69 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
70 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
72 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
74 static struct sidtab sidtab;
75 struct policydb policydb;
79 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
80 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
81 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
84 static u32 latest_granting;
86 /* Forward declaration. */
87 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
90 static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
91 struct context *tcontext,
94 struct av_decision *avd);
96 struct selinux_mapping {
97 u16 value; /* policy value */
99 u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
102 static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
103 static u16 current_mapping_size;
105 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
106 struct security_class_mapping *map,
107 struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
110 struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
111 size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
114 bool print_unknown_handle = false;
116 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
123 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
124 out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
128 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
130 while (map[j].name) {
131 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
132 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
134 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
135 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
136 p_out->num_perms = 0;
140 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
143 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
145 if (pol->reject_unknown)
147 p_out->num_perms = 0;
148 print_unknown_handle = true;
153 while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
154 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
155 if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
159 p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
161 if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
163 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
164 p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
165 if (pol->reject_unknown)
167 print_unknown_handle = true;
172 p_out->num_perms = k;
175 if (print_unknown_handle)
176 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
177 pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
179 *out_map_p = out_map;
188 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
191 static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
193 if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
194 return current_mapping[tclass].value;
199 static u32 unmap_perm(u16 tclass, u32 tperm)
201 if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
205 for (i = 0; i < current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; i++)
206 if (tperm & (1<<i)) {
207 kperm |= current_mapping[tclass].perms[i];
216 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
219 if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
220 unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
223 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
224 if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
226 if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
229 avd->allowed = result;
231 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
232 if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
234 avd->auditallow = result;
236 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
237 if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
239 if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
242 avd->auditdeny = result;
248 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
249 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
252 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
253 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
254 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
255 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
256 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
258 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
259 struct context *tcontext,
260 struct context *xcontext,
261 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
265 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
266 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
267 struct constraint_expr *e;
268 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
271 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
272 switch (e->expr_type) {
288 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
292 val1 = scontext->user;
293 val2 = tcontext->user;
296 val1 = scontext->type;
297 val2 = tcontext->type;
300 val1 = scontext->role;
301 val2 = tcontext->role;
302 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
303 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
306 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
310 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
314 s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
316 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
324 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
325 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
328 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
329 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
332 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
333 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
336 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
337 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
340 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
341 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
344 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
345 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
350 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
353 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
356 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
359 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
362 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
376 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
379 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
387 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
390 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
392 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
399 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
401 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
403 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
412 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
415 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
433 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
434 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
436 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
438 struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
439 char **permission_names = args;
441 BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
443 permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
448 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
449 struct context *tcontext,
454 struct common_datum *common_dat;
455 struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
456 struct audit_buffer *ab;
458 char *scontext_name = NULL;
459 char *tcontext_name = NULL;
460 char *permission_names[32];
462 bool need_comma = false;
467 tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
468 tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
469 common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
471 /* init permission_names */
473 hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
474 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
477 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
478 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
481 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
482 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
483 &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
486 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
487 &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
490 /* audit a message */
491 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
492 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
496 audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
497 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
498 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
500 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
501 u32 mask = (1 << index);
503 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
506 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
507 need_comma ? "," : "",
508 permission_names[index]
509 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
514 /* release scontext/tcontext */
515 kfree(tcontext_name);
516 kfree(scontext_name);
522 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
523 * on boundary constraint.
525 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
526 struct context *tcontext,
529 struct av_decision *avd)
531 struct context lo_scontext;
532 struct context lo_tcontext;
533 struct av_decision lo_avd;
534 struct type_datum *source
535 = policydb.type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
536 struct type_datum *target
537 = policydb.type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
540 if (source->bounds) {
541 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
543 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
544 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
546 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
551 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
552 return; /* no masked permission */
553 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
556 if (target->bounds) {
557 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
559 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
560 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
562 context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
567 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
568 return; /* no masked permission */
569 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
572 if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
573 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
575 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
579 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
584 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
585 return; /* no masked permission */
586 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
590 /* mask violated permissions */
591 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
593 /* audit masked permissions */
594 security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
595 tclass, masked, "bounds");
600 * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
601 * the permissions in a particular class.
603 static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
604 struct context *tcontext,
607 struct av_decision *avd)
609 struct constraint_node *constraint;
610 struct role_allow *ra;
611 struct avtab_key avkey;
612 struct avtab_node *node;
613 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
614 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
615 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
619 * Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
623 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
624 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
627 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
628 if (printk_ratelimit())
629 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
633 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
636 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
637 * this permission check, then use it.
639 avkey.target_class = tclass;
640 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
641 sattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1];
642 tattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1];
643 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
644 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
645 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
646 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
647 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
649 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
650 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
651 avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
652 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
653 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
654 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
655 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
658 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
659 cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
665 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
668 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
670 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
671 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
673 avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
675 constraint = constraint->next;
679 * If checking process transition permission and the
680 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
683 if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
684 (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
685 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
686 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
687 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
688 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
692 avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
696 * If the given source and target types have boundary
697 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
698 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
700 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
701 tclass, requested, avd);
706 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
707 struct context *ncontext,
708 struct context *tcontext,
711 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
712 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
714 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen) < 0)
716 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
718 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
720 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
721 "security_validate_transition: denied for"
722 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
723 o, n, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
729 if (!selinux_enforcing)
734 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
737 struct context *ocontext;
738 struct context *ncontext;
739 struct context *tcontext;
740 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
741 struct constraint_node *constraint;
748 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
750 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
752 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
753 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
758 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
760 ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
762 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
768 ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
770 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
776 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
778 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
784 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
786 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
788 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
792 constraint = constraint->next;
796 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
801 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
802 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
803 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
804 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
806 * @oldsid : current security identifier
807 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
809 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
811 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
812 struct type_datum *type;
816 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
818 old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
820 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
825 new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
827 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
832 /* type/domain unchaned */
833 if (old_context->type == new_context->type) {
838 index = new_context->type;
840 type = policydb.type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
843 /* not bounded anymore */
849 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
850 if (type->bounds == old_context->type) {
854 index = type->bounds;
858 char *old_name = NULL;
859 char *new_name = NULL;
862 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
863 &old_name, &length) &&
864 !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
865 &new_name, &length)) {
866 audit_log(current->audit_context,
867 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
868 "op=security_bounded_transition "
870 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
877 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
883 static int security_compute_av_core(u32 ssid,
887 struct av_decision *avd)
889 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
892 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
894 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
898 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
900 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
905 rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass,
908 /* permissive domain? */
909 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
910 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
916 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
917 * @ssid: source security identifier
918 * @tsid: target security identifier
919 * @tclass: target security class
920 * @requested: requested permissions
921 * @avd: access vector decisions
923 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
924 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
925 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid or %0
926 * if the access vector decisions were computed successfully.
928 int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
932 struct av_decision *avd)
938 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
943 requested = unmap_perm(orig_tclass, orig_requested);
944 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
945 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
946 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
951 rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
952 map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
954 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
957 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
959 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
960 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
966 int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
970 struct av_decision *avd)
974 if (!ss_initialized) {
975 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
977 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
978 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
982 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
983 rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
984 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
989 * Write the security context string representation of
990 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
991 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
992 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
993 * the length of the string.
995 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1003 *scontext_len = context->len;
1004 *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
1010 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1011 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) + 1;
1012 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) + 1;
1013 *scontext_len += strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]) + 1;
1014 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
1016 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1017 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1020 *scontext = scontextp;
1023 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1025 sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
1026 policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1],
1027 policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1],
1028 policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
1029 scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_user_val_to_name[context->user - 1]) +
1030 1 + strlen(policydb.p_role_val_to_name[context->role - 1]) +
1031 1 + strlen(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[context->type - 1]);
1033 mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
1040 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1042 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1044 if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1046 return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1049 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
1050 u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1052 struct context *context;
1058 if (!ss_initialized) {
1059 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1062 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1063 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1068 strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
1069 *scontext = scontextp;
1072 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1073 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1077 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1079 context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
1081 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1083 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1088 rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
1090 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1097 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1098 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1099 * @scontext: security context
1100 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1102 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1103 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1104 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1106 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1108 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
1111 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1113 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
1117 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1119 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1120 struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1123 struct context *ctx,
1126 struct role_datum *role;
1127 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1128 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1129 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1134 /* Parse the security context. */
1137 scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1139 /* Extract the user. */
1141 while (*p && *p != ':')
1149 usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1153 ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1157 while (*p && *p != ':')
1165 role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1168 ctx->role = role->value;
1172 while (*p && *p != ':')
1177 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1178 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1181 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1183 rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1187 if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len) {
1192 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1193 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx)) {
1200 context_destroy(ctx);
1204 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1205 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1208 char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1209 struct context context;
1212 if (!ss_initialized) {
1215 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1216 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
1221 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1226 /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
1227 scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags);
1230 memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
1231 scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
1234 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1235 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1242 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1243 rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab,
1244 scontext2, scontext_len,
1246 if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1248 context.len = scontext_len;
1252 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
1253 context_destroy(&context);
1255 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1262 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1263 * @scontext: security context
1264 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1265 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1267 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1268 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1269 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1270 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1272 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
1274 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1275 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
1279 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1280 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1282 * @scontext: security context
1283 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1284 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1285 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1287 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1288 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1289 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1290 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1291 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1292 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1293 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1294 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1296 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1297 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1299 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1300 sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1303 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1306 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1307 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1310 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1311 struct context *scontext,
1312 struct context *tcontext,
1314 struct context *newcontext)
1316 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1317 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1319 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen) < 0)
1321 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen) < 0)
1323 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen) < 0)
1325 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1326 "security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
1330 n, s, t, policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass-1]);
1335 if (!selinux_enforcing)
1340 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1347 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1348 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1349 struct avtab_key avkey;
1350 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1351 struct avtab_node *node;
1355 if (!ss_initialized) {
1356 switch (orig_tclass) {
1357 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1367 context_init(&newcontext);
1369 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1372 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1374 tclass = orig_tclass;
1376 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1378 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1383 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1385 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1391 /* Set the user identity. */
1392 switch (specified) {
1393 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1395 /* Use the process user identity. */
1396 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1399 /* Use the related object owner. */
1400 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1404 /* Set the role and type to default values. */
1405 if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
1406 /* Use the current role and type of process. */
1407 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1408 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1410 /* Use the well-defined object role. */
1411 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1412 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1413 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1416 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1417 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1418 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1419 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1420 avkey.specified = specified;
1421 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1423 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1425 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1426 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1427 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1428 avdatum = &node->datum;
1435 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1436 newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
1439 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1440 if (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
1441 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1442 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1443 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
1444 roletr = roletr->next) {
1445 if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
1446 roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
1447 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1448 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1455 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1456 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1457 rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext);
1461 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1462 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
1463 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
1470 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1471 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1473 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1474 context_destroy(&newcontext);
1480 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1481 * @ssid: source security identifier
1482 * @tsid: target security identifier
1483 * @tclass: target security class
1484 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1486 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1487 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1488 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1489 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1490 * computed successfully.
1492 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid,
1497 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1501 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid,
1506 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1511 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1512 * @ssid: source security identifier
1513 * @tsid: target security identifier
1514 * @tclass: target security class
1515 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1517 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1518 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1519 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1520 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1521 * computed successfully.
1523 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1528 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, out_sid,
1533 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1534 * @ssid: source security identifier
1535 * @tsid: target security identifier
1536 * @tclass: target security class
1537 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1539 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1540 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1541 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1542 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1543 * computed successfully.
1545 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1550 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, out_sid,
1554 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1555 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1556 struct context *context,
1559 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1561 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1564 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1568 if (selinux_enforcing) {
1574 if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
1576 "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
1584 struct convert_context_args {
1585 struct policydb *oldp;
1586 struct policydb *newp;
1590 * Convert the values in the security context
1591 * structure `c' from the values specified
1592 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1593 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1594 * context is valid under the new policy.
1596 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1600 struct convert_context_args *args;
1601 struct context oldc;
1602 struct role_datum *role;
1603 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1604 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1613 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1618 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1619 c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1623 "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1625 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1627 memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1629 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1630 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1634 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1636 "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1642 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1648 /* Convert the user. */
1649 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1650 args->oldp->p_user_val_to_name[c->user - 1]);
1653 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1655 /* Convert the role. */
1656 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1657 args->oldp->p_role_val_to_name[c->role - 1]);
1660 c->role = role->value;
1662 /* Convert the type. */
1663 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1664 args->oldp->p_type_val_to_name[c->type - 1]);
1667 c->type = typdatum->value;
1669 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1673 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1674 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1675 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1680 context_destroy(&oldc);
1685 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1686 if (context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len))
1688 context_destroy(&oldc);
1693 "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1699 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1701 selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1702 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
1703 selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1704 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
1707 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
1708 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
1711 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
1712 * @data: binary policy data
1713 * @len: length of data in bytes
1715 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
1716 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
1717 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
1718 * loading the new policy.
1720 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
1722 struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
1723 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
1724 struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
1725 struct convert_context_args args;
1729 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
1731 if (!ss_initialized) {
1733 if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
1734 avtab_cache_destroy();
1737 if (selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
1739 ¤t_mapping_size)) {
1740 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1741 avtab_cache_destroy();
1744 if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
1745 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1746 avtab_cache_destroy();
1749 security_load_policycaps();
1751 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1752 selinux_complete_init();
1753 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1754 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1755 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1756 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1761 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
1764 if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp))
1767 if (sidtab_init(&newsidtab)) {
1768 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1772 if (selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map,
1776 rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
1778 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
1782 /* Clone the SID table. */
1783 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
1784 if (sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab)) {
1790 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
1791 * in the new SID table.
1793 args.oldp = &policydb;
1794 args.newp = &newpolicydb;
1795 rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
1799 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
1800 memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
1801 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
1803 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
1804 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1805 memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
1806 sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
1807 security_load_policycaps();
1808 oldmap = current_mapping;
1809 current_mapping = map;
1810 current_mapping_size = map_size;
1811 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1812 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1814 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
1815 policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
1816 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
1819 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1820 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1821 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1822 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1828 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
1829 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1835 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
1836 * @protocol: protocol number
1837 * @port: port number
1838 * @out_sid: security identifier
1840 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
1845 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1847 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
1849 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
1850 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
1851 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
1858 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1864 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
1866 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
1870 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1875 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
1876 * @name: interface name
1877 * @if_sid: interface SID
1879 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
1884 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1886 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
1888 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
1894 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
1895 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1900 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1906 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
1908 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
1911 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1915 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
1919 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
1920 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
1929 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
1930 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
1932 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
1933 * @out_sid: security identifier
1935 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
1943 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1949 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32)) {
1954 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
1956 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
1958 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
1966 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) {
1970 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
1972 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
1980 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
1986 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
1992 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
1994 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
1998 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2005 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2006 * @fromsid: starting SID
2007 * @username: username
2008 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2009 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2011 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2012 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2013 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2014 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2015 * number of elements in the array.
2018 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
2023 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2024 u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2025 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2026 struct user_datum *user;
2027 struct role_datum *role;
2028 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2034 if (!ss_initialized)
2037 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2039 context_init(&usercon);
2041 fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
2047 user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
2052 usercon.user = user->value;
2054 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2060 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2061 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
2063 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2066 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
2069 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2072 if (mynel < maxnel) {
2073 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2076 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2081 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2084 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2090 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2096 mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2102 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2103 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
2104 SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2105 PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2108 mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2120 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2121 * @fstype: filesystem type
2122 * @path: path from root of mount
2123 * @sclass: file security class
2124 * @sid: SID for path
2126 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2127 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2128 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2130 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2137 struct genfs *genfs;
2139 int rc = 0, cmp = 0;
2141 while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2144 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2146 sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
2148 for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2149 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2154 if (!genfs || cmp) {
2155 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2160 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2161 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2162 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2163 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2168 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2174 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2183 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2188 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2189 * @fstype: filesystem type
2190 * @behavior: labeling behavior
2191 * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
2193 int security_fs_use(
2195 unsigned int *behavior,
2201 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2203 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2205 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2211 *behavior = c->v.behavior;
2213 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2221 rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
2223 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2226 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2231 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2235 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2237 int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
2239 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2243 *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2249 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2253 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2257 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2259 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2260 name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
2261 (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
2264 strncpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
2265 (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
2269 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2273 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2281 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2284 int lenp, seqno = 0;
2285 struct cond_node *cur;
2287 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2289 lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2295 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2296 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2297 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
2298 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2299 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2300 policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
2302 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2303 audit_get_loginuid(current),
2304 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2307 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2309 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2312 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2313 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2318 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2321 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2323 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2324 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2325 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2330 int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
2335 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2337 len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2343 rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
2345 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2349 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2351 int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2352 char **bnames = NULL;
2353 struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2354 struct cond_node *cur;
2356 rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2359 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2360 booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2362 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2364 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2365 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2372 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2381 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2382 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2384 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2386 struct context *context1;
2387 struct context *context2;
2388 struct context newcon;
2393 if (!ss_initialized || !selinux_mls_enabled) {
2398 context_init(&newcon);
2400 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2401 context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2403 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2409 context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
2411 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2417 newcon.user = context1->user;
2418 newcon.role = context1->role;
2419 newcon.type = context1->type;
2420 rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
2424 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2425 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
2426 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
2431 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
2435 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
2436 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2437 "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
2442 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2443 context_destroy(&newcon);
2449 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2450 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2451 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2452 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2455 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2456 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2457 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2458 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2460 * | function return | @sid
2461 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2462 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2463 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2464 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2465 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2468 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
2473 struct context *nlbl_ctx;
2474 struct context *xfrm_ctx;
2476 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2477 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2478 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2479 if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
2480 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
2483 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2484 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2486 if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
2487 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2491 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2492 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2493 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2494 if (!selinux_mls_enabled) {
2495 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2499 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2501 nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
2503 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2504 __func__, nlbl_sid);
2508 xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
2510 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2511 __func__, xfrm_sid);
2515 rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
2518 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2520 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2521 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2522 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2523 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2525 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2527 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2531 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2533 struct class_datum *datum = d;
2534 char *name = k, **classes = args;
2535 int value = datum->value - 1;
2537 classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2538 if (!classes[value])
2544 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
2548 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2550 *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
2551 *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(*classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
2555 rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
2559 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
2560 kfree((*classes)[i]);
2565 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2569 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2571 struct perm_datum *datum = d;
2572 char *name = k, **perms = args;
2573 int value = datum->value - 1;
2575 perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2582 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
2584 int rc = -ENOMEM, i;
2585 struct class_datum *match;
2587 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2589 match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
2591 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
2597 *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
2598 *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(*perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
2602 if (match->comdatum) {
2603 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
2604 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
2609 rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
2615 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2619 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2620 for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
2626 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
2628 return policydb.reject_unknown;
2631 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
2633 return policydb.allow_unknown;
2637 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
2638 * @req_cap: capability
2641 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
2642 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
2643 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
2646 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
2650 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2651 rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
2652 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2657 struct selinux_audit_rule {
2659 struct context au_ctxt;
2662 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
2664 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2667 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
2672 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
2674 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
2675 struct role_datum *roledatum;
2676 struct type_datum *typedatum;
2677 struct user_datum *userdatum;
2678 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
2683 if (!ss_initialized)
2687 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2688 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2689 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2690 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2691 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2692 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2693 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
2694 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
2697 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2698 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2699 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2700 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2701 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
2702 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
2706 /* only the above fields are valid */
2710 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
2714 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
2716 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2718 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
2721 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2722 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2723 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
2727 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
2729 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2730 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2731 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
2735 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
2737 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2738 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2739 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
2743 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
2745 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2746 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2747 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2748 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2749 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
2753 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2756 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
2765 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
2766 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
2770 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
2771 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
2773 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2774 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2775 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2776 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2777 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2778 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2779 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2780 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2781 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2782 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2790 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
2791 struct audit_context *actx)
2793 struct context *ctxt;
2794 struct mls_level *level;
2795 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2799 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2800 "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
2804 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2806 if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
2807 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2808 "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
2813 ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2815 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2816 "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2822 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
2825 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2826 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2829 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
2831 case Audit_not_equal:
2832 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
2836 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2837 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2840 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
2842 case Audit_not_equal:
2843 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
2847 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2848 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2851 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
2853 case Audit_not_equal:
2854 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
2858 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2859 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2860 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2861 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2862 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
2863 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
2864 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
2867 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2870 case Audit_not_equal:
2871 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2875 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2877 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2881 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
2885 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
2886 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
2887 !mls_level_eq(level,
2888 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
2891 match = mls_level_dom(level,
2892 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
2898 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2902 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
2904 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
2905 u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
2909 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
2910 err = aurule_callback();
2914 static int __init aurule_init(void)
2918 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
2919 SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
2921 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
2925 __initcall(aurule_init);
2927 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
2929 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
2930 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
2931 * @sid: the SELinux SID
2934 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
2935 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
2936 * already been initialized.
2939 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
2944 sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
2945 if (sid_cache == NULL)
2947 secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
2948 if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
2954 secattr->cache->free = kfree;
2955 secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
2956 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
2960 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
2961 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
2962 * @sid: the SELinux SID
2965 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
2966 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
2967 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the
2968 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
2969 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
2970 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
2974 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
2978 struct context *ctx;
2979 struct context ctx_new;
2981 if (!ss_initialized) {
2986 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2988 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) {
2989 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
2991 } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) {
2992 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
2994 } else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
2995 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
2997 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
2999 context_init(&ctx_new);
3000 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3001 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3002 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3003 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
3004 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3005 if (ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3006 secattr->attr.mls.cat) != 0)
3007 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3008 memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
3009 &ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3010 sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
3012 if (mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new) != 1)
3013 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
3015 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3017 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup;
3019 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3021 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3027 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return:
3028 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3030 netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return_cleanup:
3031 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3032 goto netlbl_secattr_to_sid_return;
3036 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3037 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3038 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3041 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3042 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3045 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3048 struct context *ctx;
3050 if (!ss_initialized)
3053 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3054 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3057 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3059 secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
3061 if (secattr->domain == NULL) {
3063 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3065 secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3066 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3067 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
3068 rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
3070 goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
3071 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3075 netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure:
3076 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3079 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */