From: Dan Rosenberg Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 10:43:14 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow in l2cap config request, CVE-2011-2497 X-Git-Url: http://git.alex.org.uk Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow in l2cap config request, CVE-2011-2497 A remote user can provide a small value for the command size field in the command header of an l2cap configuration request, resulting in an integer underflow when subtracting the size of the configuration request header. This results in copying a very large amount of data via memcpy() and destroying the kernel heap. Check for underflow. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan (backported from commit 7ac28817536797fd40e9646452183606f9e17f71) CVE-2011-2497 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/838423 Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner --- diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c index 6d89069..04120ff 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap.c @@ -3117,7 +3117,7 @@ static inline int l2cap_config_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr /* Reject if config buffer is too small. */ len = cmd_len - sizeof(*req); - if (l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_len + len > sizeof(l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_req)) { + if (len < 0 || l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_len + len > sizeof(l2cap_pi(sk)->conf_req)) { l2cap_send_cmd(conn, cmd->ident, L2CAP_CONF_RSP, l2cap_build_conf_rsp(sk, rsp, L2CAP_CONF_REJECT, flags), rsp);