From: Vasiliy Kulikov Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2011 12:37:13 +0000 (+0100) Subject: ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace X-Git-Url: http://git.alex.org.uk ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/761134 commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream. Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner --- diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 830921e..eadafbf 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -1274,6 +1274,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len) /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1820,6 +1821,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len) return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -2049,6 +2051,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len) ret = -EFAULT; break; } + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0; if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET) target = 1;