Update to 3.4-final.

[linux-flexiantxendom0-3.2.10.git] / Documentation / intel_txt.txt

diff --git a/Documentation/intel_txt.txt b/Documentation/intel_txt.txt
index 1423bcc..849de1a 100644 (file)
--- a/Documentation/intel_txt.txt
+++ b/Documentation/intel_txt.txt
@@ -25,20 +25,18 @@ which has been updated for the new released platforms.
 Intel TXT has been presented at various events over the past few
 years, some of which are:
       LinuxTAG 2008:
-          http://www.linuxtag.org/2008/en/conf/events/vp-donnerstag/
-          details.html?talkid=110
+          http://www.linuxtag.org/2008/en/conf/events/vp-donnerstag.html
       TRUST2008:
-          http://www.trust2008.eu/downloads/Keynote-Speakers/
+          http://www.trust-conference.eu/downloads/Keynote-Speakers/
           3_David-Grawrock_The-Front-Door-of-Trusted-Computing.pdf
-      IDF 2008, Shanghai:
-          http://inteldeveloperforum.com.edgesuite.net/shanghai_2008/
-          aep/PROS003/index.html
+      IDF, Shanghai:
+          http://www.prcidf.com.cn/index_en.html
       IDFs 2006, 2007 (I'm not sure if/where they are online)
 
 Trusted Boot Project Overview:
 =============================
 
-Trusted Boot (tboot) is an open source, pre- kernel/VMM module that
+Trusted Boot (tboot) is an open source, pre-kernel/VMM module that
 uses Intel TXT to perform a measured and verified launch of an OS
 kernel/VMM.
 
@@ -161,13 +159,15 @@ o  In order to put a system into any of the sleep states after a TXT
       has been restored, it will restore the TPM PCRs and then
       transfer control back to the kernel's S3 resume vector.
       In order to preserve system integrity across S3, the kernel
-      provides tboot with a set of memory ranges (kernel
-      code/data/bss, S3 resume code, and AP trampoline) that tboot
-      will calculate a MAC (message authentication code) over and then
-      seal with the TPM.  On resume and once the measured environment
-      has been re-established, tboot will re-calculate the MAC and
-      verify it against the sealed value.  Tboot's policy determines
-      what happens if the verification fails.
+      provides tboot with a set of memory ranges (RAM and RESERVED_KERN
+      in the e820 table, but not any memory that BIOS might alter over
+      the S3 transition) that tboot will calculate a MAC (message
+      authentication code) over and then seal with the TPM. On resume
+      and once the measured environment has been re-established, tboot
+      will re-calculate the MAC and verify it against the sealed value.
+      Tboot's policy determines what happens if the verification fails.
+      Note that the c/s 194 of tboot which has the new MAC code supports
+      this.
 
 That's pretty much it for TXT support.